Comparative Shiʿi Theology

Abstract This research examines the contrast between the views of Fakhr al-Razi (inclined to determinism) and Allama Tabataba'i (with an emphasis on human agency) on the issue of determinism and free will under the concept of divine destiny and predestination. The method of this research is descriptive-analytical and its main goal is to analyze the contrast between the views of Fakhr al-Razi and Allama Tabataba'i on the issue of determinism and free will. The main point of commonality between these two thinkers is the simultaneous acceptance of the two principles of "God's omniscience and power" and "the conscientious reality of human agency," and both seek to provide an explanation that neither leads to absolute determinism nor negates divine a priori knowledge. However, the difference in the doctrinal foundations (Ash'ari Kalam versus transcendental wisdom) has led to the contrast between the views. Fakhr-e-Razi (representative of the Ash'arite school) attributes agency to God with the theory of "acquiring" and has oscillating positions and a tendency toward predestination. Allamah Tabataba'i (representative of transcendental wisdom), relying on "existential connection", considers human beings to be independent but related agents and, by distinguishing between "qadah" (divine universal decree) and "qadar" (predestination in the material world), presents a more coherent and balanced combination between human free will and God's power

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The question of theism in Islamic kalām, beyond its epistemological and theological dimensions, also concerns the explanation of the relationship between God and human action and the meaning of human agency in the world. This issue, in addition to its anthropological consequences, may also entail significant psychological implications. Nevertheless, the fundamental differences between theological interpretations of theism—particularly within the Imami and Ashʿari traditions—have rarely been examined systematically in interdisciplinary scholarship. The present study adopts a descriptive–analytical and comparative approach, focusing on the conceptual analysis of classical theological texts, in order to compare these two interpretations of theism and to investigate their psychological implications in relation to human well-being. In this study, Ryff’s model of psychological well-being is employed solely as a theoretical framework for conceptualizing the components of well-being, and no empirical or psychometric claims are advanced. The analysis concentrates on three dimensions: autonomy, purpose in life, and self-acceptance. The findings suggest that the Imami theological emphasis on the doctrine of al amr bayn al amrayn (the intermediate position between determinism and absolute delegation) and its particular interpretation of human agency provides greater explanatory capacity for the meaningfulness of human action, moral responsibility, and a positive experience of the self. By contrast, the Ashʿari interpretation of theism, grounded in the doctrine of kasb (acquisition) and prioritizing divine unity in acts (tawḥīd al afʿāl), leads to a different model of human agency that is more closely associated with acceptance of and submission to the divine will, thereby generating distinct psychological implications, particularly at the levels of purpose in life and self-acceptance. Accordingly, theological analysis can provide a credible and non-reductionist foundation for understanding the psychological implications of theism.

Abstract Abstract This article undertakes a comparative analysis of Christian ecumenism and Islamic rapprochement as two theological responses to the challenge of intra-religious plurality and conflict. The central question of the study is whether, from the perspective of Islamic theological foundations, ecumenism can be regarded as possessing a form of theological legitimacy, and what the boundaries and conditions of such legitimacy might be. Employing a descriptive–analytical approach and relying on documentary analysis, the study reconstructs the conceptual structures of both discourses through an examination of official ecumenical documents (including those of the World Council of Churches and the Second Vatican Council), contemporary Christian theological literature, and classical as well as contemporary Islamic juridical and theological sources. The findings demonstrate that while ecumenism and rapprochement display conceptual convergence at the level of a “theology of unity” and the “management of disagreement,” ecumenism, as a doctrinal model of unity, cannot be considered theologically legitimate as a model for emulation within Islam, due to its incompatibility with Islamic monotheistic principles and the revelatory–ijtihādī logic of Islamic theology. Nevertheless, certain procedural and managerial aspects of ecumenism, once subjected to theological delimitation and critical contextualization, may be selectively utilized within the framework of the discourse of Islamic rapprochement.

Abstract This study examines the theological foundations of the Islamic Sciences Academy of Qom’s critique of modernity. Grounded in Shi‘i theology and emphasizing three fundamental principles—*the maximal comprehensiveness of religion*, *divine guardianship (wilāyah)*, and *a monotheistic ontology*—the Academy interprets modernity not merely as a historical phenomenon but as a rival theological system standing in opposition to tawḥīd (divine unity). From this perspective, modernity rests upon three core components: humanism, liberalism, and rationalism. Each of these, in different ways, institutionalizes the substitution of the human being for God, human will for divine will, and self-foundational reason for reason guided by divine authority. Focusing primarily on the religious–theological dimension, the article argues that the Academy regards modern secularism as a denial of the comprehensiveness of religion and a negation of divine guardianship, considering it a form of civilizational shirk (associative deviation). The study further explores the relationship between this approach and the tradition of rationalist uṣūlī thought in Shi‘i theology, analyzing its internal theological challenges. The findings suggest that the Academy’s critique is fundamentally civilizational in nature, yet it raises significant theoretical questions concerning the role and status of reason.

Abstract The theory of Imamate in Imami theology faces explanatory challenges regarding the nature of the Imam's active presence in the world and the relationship between the static nature of the Imamate station and the dynamism of existence. The present study seeks to provide a novel ontological framework for Imamate using the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. The data were collected through library research and analyzed using a comparative-hermeneutic approach; in this method, Whitehead's key concepts have been compared with the doctrines of Imamate, Divine Vicegerency (Wilayah), and Infallibility ('Ismah). The analyses indicate that the Imam can act as an active phenomenological entity within the flow of existence, guiding the world toward perfection through continuous engagement with it. Reconstructing Imamate in a process-oriented manner explains the concept of continuous Wilayah as a dynamic mechanism for guiding existence and resolves the limitations of static perspectives within Imami theology. The innovation of this research lies in integrating process philosophy with Shi'i theology and presenting a new ontological framework for Imamate.

Abstract The Narrated Attributes of "love", "pleasure" and "anger", which are used for God in the Quran and traditions, have created a great doctrinal challenge, because their appearance is consistent with human emotions and leads different schools of thought to disagree. Salafis insist on superficial proof without quality, Ash'arites seek a middle way of proof and interpretation, Mu'tazilites resort to purely figurative interpretation. The need for research arises from contemporary sectarian doubts in cyberspace and Salafi-Shiite scholarly debates, where Salafi proof without quality may lead to the idea of human emotions for God. The existence of such differences threatens the unity of the Ummah. The present study facilitates the scientific dialogue between Islamic schools by conducting a comparative-critical study of the Salafi and Imami views. It aims to compare and evaluate the Salafi and Imami views of hadith interpretation by using an analytical-critical method, while briefly examining the lexical and interpretive views on the attributes under discussion, based on the narrations of both sects. The results of the study show that the Salafi hadith commentators prove that the mentioned attributes are real and apparent for God. Accordingly, love is a true affection accompanied by victory, and contentment is a lasting satisfaction without human qualities. From the perspective of the Salafi commentators, anger is a kind of voluntary punishment of God on servants that is not similar to creation, but the Imami view considers love to be the manifestation of God's pleasure in the satisfaction of His loved ones, and anger means the temporary cessation of God's mercy. As a result, the Imami view, while absolutely excluding God from human attributes, shows greater compatibility with strong Quranic verses, narrations, and rational reasons.

Abstract One of the most important philosophical and theological discussions is the discussion of the attributes of God, because without a doubt, knowing God would be impossible without knowing His attributes. The main issue of the present study is to examine this fundamental question: How can God’s eternal knowledge be applied to contingent and partial matters, and what is the quality of God’s will? The present study aims to achieve a comparative system of the opinions of these three thinkers that can outline the range of possible solutions to these issues, relying on the analytical-descriptive method and based on library resources. Research findings: ʻAbduh believes that the divine attributes are understood from the essence itself and are nothing but an interpretation of the quality of existence. He forbids entering into the understanding of the quality of divine knowledge, and regarding divine will, he also believes that the concept of God’s will is rooted in the theory of divine knowledge and the issuance of possibilities from God. In contrast, Allamah and Javadi Amoli believe that we should attribute the meanings of the attributes, which express perfection, to God. They consider God's knowledge to be a type of present knowledge, and they consider will to be an attribute of action, and they consider the will of the servant in every action to be dependent on the divine will. As a result, it can be said that the difference in epistemological foundations (such as accepting or rejecting present knowledge) and ontological foundations (such as the objectivity or non-objectivity of attributes with the essence) in the theological views of these three thinkers has led to fundamental distinctions in explaining the attributes of divine knowledge and will.

Abstract The question of reason and its functioning in religious knowledge is among the disputed topics in Islamic thought. Given the emphasis of the tafkik (separation) school on transmissionism and its minimal or negative approach to the role of reason in understanding religion, this study seeks—by analyzing the method of Allameh Majlisi, who is known for transmissionism, in his engagement with reason and by comparing it with the tafkik perspective—to clarify the degree of consonance or distinction between these two approaches. Therefore, the main research question, which is theoretical and problem-centered, is what the method of engaging with reason is from the viewpoints of Allameh Majlisi and the tafkik school, and what their points of agreement and difference are. The study’s data were obtained through library research and analysis of these thinkers’ works, and by rational and textual evaluation of the data it became clear that Allameh Majlisi adopted an affirmative approach to reason as one of the human faculties and was receptive to rational perceptions, whereas the tafkikis, with various approaches, either do not accept such rational cognitions or consider them to have no function in religious knowledge. This research shows that Allameh Majlisi and the tafkikis have a fundamental disagreement in their approach to reason and that their views are not close to one another. It also finds that the tafkiki method of engaging with reason faces multiple objections and that their view appears incorrect.

Abstract In Imami Islamic theology, the “proof of nature” relies on the innate desire for God and theology of man. The question is how this proof proceeds from the innate tendency to affirm the existence of God and what is its relation to “reformed epistemology.” The aim of explaining the Imami versions of the proof of nature and comparing it with the theory of “foundational belief” in reformed epistemology (especially in Plantinga) is to clarify the rationality of believing in God without a priori reliance on classical proofs. The research is descriptive-analytical and comparative with a library method; the Quranic, narrative and philosophical concepts of nature are extracted from Imami sources and systematically compared with the components of reformed epistemology. The research findings show that the proof of nature is based on two components: (1) the innate tendency to absolute perfection and the sacred (love of goodness, truth and worship), (2) the innate insight/affirmation of the origin of existence. Thinkers such as Mulla Sadra, Allama Tabataba'i, Imam Khomeini (RA), and Javadi Amoli consider this tendency/insight to be a sign of the real existence of its subject. In reformed epistemology, too, belief in God can be a basic and reasonable belief and arise from the correct functioning of the sense of theology.

Abstract Ihtawt, also known as Habat al-Amal in Islamic theology, is primarily concerned with explaining and analyzing the complex relationship between faith and righteous and unrighteous deeds on the one hand, and happiness and misery in the hereafter on the other. Although the precise concept of Ihtawt with its theological details is not found in Christian teachings, But there are conceptual similarities between these teachings. The main difference between these two intellectual traditions is in the quality of occurrence and the scope of the effect of frustration. This article aims to comparatively examine the frustration of action as one of the most fundamental and challenging topics in the field of Islamic theology and comparative theology, which has been examined and explained with an emphasis on the teachings of the Imamiyyah and Christianity.This study, with an analytical and documentary approach, has examined the different perspectives of Islam, especially the Imamiyyah, and Christianity. The results of this study emphasize the remarkable alignment of the Imamiyyah theology and the theology of Catholic Christianity, in such a way that both carry the meaning of absolution in a figurative sense and deny the general absolution of actionsThis alignment opens new horizons for comparative studies in theology. The conclusion of this article is that from the Islamic perspective, every good or bad deed has its own account and sin does not necessarily lead to the complete destruction of a good deed;.Also, none of the main branches of Christianity believe in the annulment of past actions; even the Catholic Church has provided ways, such as the sacrament of penance (confession), to restore a relationship with God after sins.

Abstract The Holy Prophet (PBUH) is a good example and a model for all freedom seekers in the world. On this basis, all existential dimensions and scientific and practical aspects of his life have been considered. The Holy Quran was revealed to him. The main question is, from what other source of revelation did the knowledge of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) originate? Some consider it to be the result of his ijtihad, while others consider the origin of the Prophet's knowledge (PBUH) to be a non-Quranic revelation. This research is based on a descriptive-analytical method and uses library resources. Given that the subject is studied in a comparative manner, the scope of the research is the works and books of interpretation and hadith of Shia and Sunni. The purpose of this article is to examine non-Quranic revelation in the sources of the two sects; which is referred to as Bayani revelation in Shia sources and Sunnah revelation or unread revelation in Sunni sources. The results of this study are that Muslims consider the origin of the knowledge of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) to be Quranic and non-Quranic revelation. Regarding non-Quranic revelation, Sunni interpretations and hadith sources mainly refer to a narration, which is known as the Hadith of Arikah. This narration has also been mentioned in Shiite hadith and exegesis sources. Examining the sources, chain of custody, and implications of this narration makes it clear that the origin of the discussion of non-Quranic revelation regarding the Prophet (PBUH) is common among scholars of both sects.

Abstract The indicative identity of the Nabi (Prophet) highlights the social and propagational dimension of the prophet and emphasizes his responsibility in conveying divine revelation to people. The present article with a descriptive-analytical method is an answer to the question that from the perspective of the Shaykh Mufid and Shaykh Tusi, is a Nabi (Prophet), like a Rasul (Messenger), responsible for conveying divine revelation or not? The purpose of the research is to compare the viewpoints of the Shaykh Mufid and Shaykh Tusi, about the necessity of conveying revelation by the Nabi (Prophet). Based on the findings of this research Shaykh Tusi, based on the lexical meaning of Nabi, believe that both a Nabi and a Rasul (Messenger) have the same duty in conveying God’s message to the people. but, Shaykh Mufid believes that the concept of Nabi has a more inclusive and extensive, because the concept of Rasul is limited to having the mission of conveying, while this condition is not included in the definition of Nabi. Therefore, from Shaykh Mufid's perspective, the term Nabi should be understood as the possessor of news and the receiver of news, not the conveyer of news. this meaning does not necessitate the promulgation of the news and conveying it to others, and it is consistent with his interpretation of the generality of the Nabi over the Rasul. The apparent meaning of verses such as (Al-Baqarah:213, Al-Hajj:52, Maryam:51, Al-Furqan:31) casts doubt upon Shaykh Mufid’s view regarding the generality (encompassing nature) of the Nabi over the Rasul concerning the mission of conveying divine revelation.