Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1 PhD Candidate in Philosophy and Islamic Theology, Imam Sadiq University (Women’s Campus), Tehran, Iran.
2 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Islamic Theology, Imam Sadeq University, Tehran Sisters Campus.
3 Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Ethics, Qom University of Islamic Education.
Abstract
Egoism and ethical altruism, as two rival paradigms in explaining the motivations behind human action, have always been at the center of philosophical debates. The present study, employing an analytical-comparative method and a critical approach, examines the intellectual foundations of egoism in Hobbes's philosophy and innate altruism in Motahhari's thought, and evaluates the possibility of "loving altruism" as a critique of reducing human motivations to personal interest.
The findings indicate that Hobbes, based on materialist and mechanical presuppositions, introduces humans as selfish beings whose every action—even seemingly altruistic ones—ultimately reduces to self-love, sensory pleasure-seeking, and physical survival. In contrast, Motahhari, by distinguishing between the "lower self" (khod-e dāni) and the "higher self" (khod-e āli) and emphasizing divine innate disposition (fitrah) as the source of authentic moral inclinations, explains two levels of altruism: calculative altruism (aimed at self-perfection) and loving altruism (directed toward the good of the other without any personal motive).
The fundamental critique of the present study is that Hobbesian egoism is not a comprehensive description of human nature, but rather the product of Hobbes's intellectual presuppositions based on the reduction of existence to matter and the negation of the metaphysical dimensions of the human being. In contrast, Motahhari, as a Neo-Sadrian philosopher who accepts the gradational hierarchy of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), the substantial motion of the soul (al-harakat al-jawhariyyah), and the distinction between fitrah and physical nature (tabī'ah), provides a well-grounded explanation of altruism—in which pleasure is considered a "necessity" of the moral act rather than its "ultimate goal."
This article demonstrates that Hobbesian egoism leads to moral relativism, whereas Motahhari's innate altruism provides a foundation for a universal and robust moral system.
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