Comparative Shiʿi Theology

Abstract Contemporary anthropocentrism takes the human being as the point of departure for meaning and value, yet it encounters a theoretical difficulty in explaining altruism as a mode of ultimate human perfection. The question is whether the conscious transcendence of the limited self for the sake of a true end negates human value or constitutes a fuller realization of human nature. The study assesses the explanatory capacity of contemporary anthropocentrism and formulates “altruistic self-perfection” as a philosophical-theological model within Shi'a theology. The study employs an analytical, comparative, and critical method: it distinguishes key concepts, compares selected anthropocentric approaches with Shi'a theology, and evaluates their accounts of altruistic action. Altruistic self-perfection is an analytical formulation of the anthropological, deontological, and teleological resources of Shi'a theology. Self-grounding anthropocentrism cannot show how transcending the limited self constitutes ultimate human perfection, whereas Shi'a theology, while preserving reason, freedom, and dignity, explains altruism as a truth-oriented movement from the limited self to the perfectible self, conditioned on awareness, free agency, justice, valid proof, and the truth of the end. Human perfection is thus realized neither in self-grounding nor in self-negation, but in the conscious and voluntary orientation of the human being toward a true end.

Abstract Egoism and ethical altruism, as two rival paradigms in explaining the motivations behind human action, have always been at the center of philosophical debates. The present study, employing an analytical-comparative method and a critical approach, examines the intellectual foundations of egoism in Hobbes's philosophy and innate altruism in Motahhari's thought, and evaluates the possibility of "loving altruism" as a critique of reducing human motivations to personal interest.

The findings indicate that Hobbes, based on materialist and mechanical presuppositions, introduces humans as selfish beings whose every action—even seemingly altruistic ones—ultimately reduces to self-love, sensory pleasure-seeking, and physical survival. In contrast, Motahhari, by distinguishing between the "lower self" (khod-e dāni) and the "higher self" (khod-e āli) and emphasizing divine innate disposition (fitrah) as the source of authentic moral inclinations, explains two levels of altruism: calculative altruism (aimed at self-perfection) and loving altruism (directed toward the good of the other without any personal motive).

The fundamental critique of the present study is that Hobbesian egoism is not a comprehensive description of human nature, but rather the product of Hobbes's intellectual presuppositions based on the reduction of existence to matter and the negation of the metaphysical dimensions of the human being. In contrast, Motahhari, as a Neo-Sadrian philosopher who accepts the gradational hierarchy of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), the substantial motion of the soul (al-harakat al-jawhariyyah), and the distinction between fitrah and physical nature (tabī'ah), provides a well-grounded explanation of altruism—in which pleasure is considered a "necessity" of the moral act rather than its "ultimate goal."

This article demonstrates that Hobbesian egoism leads to moral relativism, whereas Motahhari's innate altruism provides a foundation for a universal and robust moral system.

Abstract The transformation of doctrinal disagreements into sacred conflicts is one of the major challenges in Islamic theology, political theology, and the history of Islamic thought. This study examines the theological foundations and epistemological mechanisms underlying the formation of the “theology of war” in Islamic theological schools. The main question is how theological structures transform religious disagreements into sacred violence and what internal capacities exist within Islamic traditions to restrain this process. Using a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach, this research investigates the theological foundations of war and peace among the Kharijites, Khavarej, Mo'tazele, Asha'ere, Maturidiye va Emamiye. The findings indicate that the theology of war is not merely a consequence of legal doctrines or political conditions; rather, it emerges from a network of epistemological, anthropological, and eschatological concepts. The of truth claims, rigid identity boundaries, expansion of excommunication, and the transformation of opponents into “theological enemies” are the main stages through which disagreement develops into sacred violence. The comparative analysis shows that the essential difference among theological schools lies not in their belief in religious truth, but in their interpretation of the relationship between truth, error, and the religious other. The study concludes that confronting religious violence requires not the rejection of religion, but a critical internal reinterpretation of religious traditions based on rationality, justice, and human dignity.

Abstract Abstract

The issue of Imamate and the succession of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) has long been a central point of disagreement between Shiʿa and Sunni Muslims, giving rise to further theological and social challenges. This study aims to identify the main theological disputes between the two groups and examine the solutions proposed by ʿAbd al‑Jalil Qazvīnī. Using textual analysis of al‑Naqd, the research addresses the key question of what the major points of contention are and how Qazvīnī suggests they may be resolved.

The findings show that these challenges fall into three main categories—knowledge of origin, guidance, and destination. Qazvīnī’s proposed solutions, despite some shortcomings, offer a constructive model for reducing tensions and promoting unity. His approach suggests that Sunnis and followers of the Ahl al‑Bayt (peace be upon them) can maintain their doctrinal principles while building a cohesive and peaceful Islamic society through mutual understanding.

Abstract Mainstream theories of social welfare and liberal justice, grounded in the image of the independent and self-sufficient individual, do not provide sufficient conceptual tools to analyze situations in which social order collapses—particularly in conditions of war, organized violence, and large-scale crises. This study seeks to address this gap by comparatively examining two distinct theoretical frameworks: the “ethics of care” within contemporary Western social philosophy as developed by Carol Gilligan, and the “logic of relationality and fraternity” in Islamic–Shi’a thought. The research methodology is based on the principle of “functional equivalence,” and the comparison is conducted at three levels: anthropological assumptions, relational ethics, and institutional mechanisms.

The findings indicate that both frameworks, unlike dominant theories, conceptualize war as a “relational phenomenon”—the outcome of the breakdown of networks of responsibility, trust, and solidarity—rather than merely a conflict of interests or a failure of diplomacy. Furthermore, both frameworks define peace as a “relational achievement,” in which networks of care, fraternity, and mutual solidarity (takāful) constitute the social infrastructure for the reproduction of order. The study shows that the two frameworks are complementary: the ethics of care provides a precise analytical tool for understanding lived experiences of vulnerability and structural injustice, while Islamic fraternity offers a stronger normative foundation and more articulated institutional mechanisms (such as wilāya and takāful). Accordingly, a four-level “care–fraternity” model is proposed as a relational infrastructure of peace. The main policy implication of this study is that successful post-conflict reconstruction must begin, prior to any physical or political rebuilding, with the reconstruction of the society’s “relational infrastructure.”

Abstract The issue of war and the determination of its moral boundaries have always been fundamental challenges in the political theology of religions. The present study aimed to conduct a comparative analysis of the theological and epistemological foundations of civilian immunity in armed conflicts from the perspective of the Old Testament theology and Imami theology (manifested in the military Seerah of Imam Ali, peace be upon him). Employing a qualitative, descriptive-analytical method and a comparative theological approach, this study examined library data extracted from the Old Testament texts (focusing on the Books of Deuteronomy and Joshua) and the Nahj al-Balagha. The findings revealed that the military approach in certain Old Testament battles was based on the theological doctrine of "Herem" (total destruction) and the "Divine Command Theory," where God's will is not constrained by human perceptions of justice, thus providing theological justification for the annihilation of civilians to preserve the purity of the chosen people. In contrast, the military Seerah of Imam Ali (AS) was founded upon the theological doctrines of "inherent rational good and evil" and "Divine Justice." Accordingly, the life of a civilian, regardless of their beliefs, was considered to possess inherent dignity and absolute immunity. It was concluded that the disparity in the military conduct of these two traditions towards civilians was not merely a jurisprudential or historical difference; rather, it was rooted in the confrontation of two distinct epistemological systems: an exclusionary and ethnocentric theology versus a justice-oriented and dignity-based theology.

Abstract

Abstract The doctrine of Imamate in Imami Shiʿism underwent a fundamental transformation during the second half of the third/ninth century, coinciding with the Minor Occultation (al-Ghayba al-Ṣughrā). Following the martyrdom of Imam al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī (a), the Imami community faced a crisis of succession and the emergence of competing intellectual currents, including the Neo-Wāqifa, Jaʿfariyya, and Muḥammadiyya. Within this intellectual milieu, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad ʿAllān al-Kulaynī al-Rāzī (fl. 279/892), a prominent Imami scholar, sought to document and consolidate the doctrine of the Twelfth Imam through his work Akhbār al-Qāʾim. Although the original text has not survived, a substantial portion of its transmitted reports has been preserved in al-Kāfī. Employing a historical-theological approach and drawing upon the traditions attributed to ʿAllān al-Kulaynī in al-Kāfī, this study reconstructs the principal components of his theory of Imamate. The findings indicate that ʿAllān emphasized such foundational principles as the necessity of the continuous existence of the divine proof (ḥujja), the designation of the Imam through explicit textual appointment (naṣṣ), the restriction of the Imamate of two brothers to al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn (a), the transmission of the Imamate from father to son, the legitimacy of a child Imam, the living existence of the Twelfth Imam, and his occultation as a divinely ordained doctrine. The extensive transmission of reports concerning the birth, eyewitness accounts, occultation, and designation of Imam al-Ḥujja (a) in his works demonstrates a deliberate effort to address the theological challenges of his time and to defend the Twelver doctrine of Imamate during one of the most critical periods in the history of Shiʿism.

Abstract The issue of observing human rights in situations of war, as one of the most challenging yet fundamental legal and ethical concerns in the contemporary world, has consistently attracted the attention of scholars. Within this context, elucidating the Shiʿi perspective on human rights in armed conflict can provide a systematic response to questions concerning the relationship between religion, violence, and human dignity, while also revealing the often-overlooked capacities of Islamic jurisprudence and ethics. Accordingly, the present study adopts a descriptive–analytical approach to examine the theoretical foundations and core criteria of human rights in wartime on the basis of Shiʿi juridical, ethical, and theological teachings.

The primary focus of the study is placed on the concept of defensive jihad and the elucidation of key components such as the protection of inherent human dignity, the observance of justice, adherence to ethical principles in military conduct, and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, all of which are analyzed in light of Qurʾanic and hadith-based sources. The findings indicate that within the Shiʿi epistemological framework, the legitimacy and meaningfulness of defensive jihad are intrinsically and inseparably linked to the observance of human rights and moral constraints, to the extent that any violation of these principles removes military action from its legitimate and religious framework

Abstract One of the reasons that a number of Sunnis have cited to prove the legitimacy of Abu Bakr is the meaning of verse 110 of Surah Al-Imran.God (PBUH) as “the best of the nation” and their fulfillment of the duty of enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong indicates the correctness of their action in choosing Abu Bakr. Because if this were not the case, they would have committed wrongdoing. This research, using sources of narration and a descriptive-analytical method and in some cases exploratory, seeks to validate the aforementioned claim. To achieve this goal, the content elements of the claim have been divided into the following three categories: 1) The addressee of the companions in the verse; 2) The formation of the concept of goodness; and 3) The enjoining of all good deeds and forbidding all evil deeds by the companions. To prove the claim of the Sunnis, it is necessary that these three components be proven. In the next step, a logical analysis of each of these three components is addressed. The achievement of the article is that, given the relative nature of the concept of goodness and the conditional nature of the description, the addressee of the verse is all those who perform the duty of enjoining good and forbidding evil, and this attribute cannot be proven for all the companions who pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr. Also, there was no consensus on the allegiance to Abu Bakr by all the companions.