Comparative Shiʿi Theology

Abstract Contemporary anthropocentrism takes the human being as the point of departure for meaning and value, yet it encounters a theoretical difficulty in explaining altruism as a mode of ultimate human perfection. The question is whether the conscious transcendence of the limited self for the sake of a true end negates human value or constitutes a fuller realization of human nature. The study assesses the explanatory capacity of contemporary anthropocentrism and formulates “altruistic self-perfection” as a philosophical-theological model within Shi'a theology. The study employs an analytical, comparative, and critical method: it distinguishes key concepts, compares selected anthropocentric approaches with Shi'a theology, and evaluates their accounts of altruistic action. Altruistic self-perfection is an analytical formulation of the anthropological, deontological, and teleological resources of Shi'a theology. Self-grounding anthropocentrism cannot show how transcending the limited self constitutes ultimate human perfection, whereas Shi'a theology, while preserving reason, freedom, and dignity, explains altruism as a truth-oriented movement from the limited self to the perfectible self, conditioned on awareness, free agency, justice, valid proof, and the truth of the end. Human perfection is thus realized neither in self-grounding nor in self-negation, but in the conscious and voluntary orientation of the human being toward a true end.

Abstract Moral egoism and altruism, two rival paradigms for explaining human motives, have long been central to philosophical debate. The central question is whether transcendent philosophy can explain “loving altruism” as a level of action motivated solely by the good of another, and whether this account offers a fundamental critique of Hobbes’s egoistic reductionism. The study critically examines the foundations of Hobbes’s egoism and Motahhari’s innate altruism and assesses the possibility of loving altruism. The study is analytical-comparative: it reconstructs Hobbes’s egoism from his ontological and anthropological foundations, explains Motahhari’s view of the twofold nature of the human being, and critically compares the foundations of both views. Through his materialist and mechanistic presuppositions, Hobbes portrays the human being as selfish, whose actions, even seemingly altruistic ones, all reduce to self-love, sensory pleasure, and physical survival. Motahhari, by contrast, distinguishes the “lower self” from the “superior self” and, emphasizing the divine fitrat as the source of authentic moral inclinations, explains two levels of altruism: calculative (oriented toward self-perfection) and loving (oriented toward the good of another without any personal motive). Hobbes’s egoism is not a comprehensive description of human nature but a product of confining existence to matter and denying the metaphysical dimensions of the human being. Motahhari, by accepting the gradation of existence, the substantial motion of the soul, and the distinction between fitrat and nature, offers a justified account of altruism. Hobbes’s egoism therefore leads to ethical relativism, whereas Motahhari’s innate altruism grounds a universal and stable ethics.

Abstract The transformation of doctrinal disagreements into sacred conflicts is a major challenge in theological studies, political theology, and the history of Islamic thought. The central question is which theological structures turn religious disagreement into sacred violence, and what capacities Islamic theological traditions possess to restrain this process. The study analyzes the theological foundations and epistemic mechanisms underlying the formation of a “theology of war” in Islamic sects. Using a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach, the study examines the theological foundations of the theology of war among the Khawārij, Muʿtazila, Ashʿarīs, Māturīdīs, and Imāmiyya. The theology of war is not merely a product of juristic rulings or political circumstances, but of a network of epistemological, soteriological, anthropological, and eschatological concepts. The monopolization of truth, the absolutization of identity boundaries, the expansion of takfīr (excommunication), and turning the opponent into a “theological enemy” are the main stages in the escalation from disagreement to sacred violence. The schools differ not in their belief in religious truth but in how they construe the relationship between truth, error, and the religious other. By narrowing the distance between error and unbelief, the Khawārij developed a strong capacity for a theology of elimination, whereas the Muʿtazila and the Imāmiyya, by distinguishing degrees of error and restricting takfīr, provided greater theological resources for limiting violence. Confronting religious violence requires not the rejection of religion but a critical internal rereading that strengthens interpretations linking the pursuit of truth with rationality, justice, and human dignity.

Abstract The question of the Imamate and succession to the Prophet is the most fundamental source of divergence between Shiʿi and Sunni Muslims and has historically generated wide-ranging theological disputes concerning knowledge of the Origin, of the Guides, and of the Destination. The study asks how loyalty to the principles of Shiʿism can be balanced with the necessity of Islamic convergence, and what ʿAbd al-Jalīl Qazvīnī’s views are on this question. The study aims to explain the most important doctrinal challenges between the two schools and to analyze the conciliatory (taqrībī) solutions proposed by ʿAbd al-Jalīl Qazvīnī in al-Naqḍ (sixth century AH), since examining historical models of convergence in periods of tension can illuminate contemporary challenges. The study employs a descriptive-analytical method based on a textual analysis of al-Naqḍ. Adopting a “moderate rationalism,” Qazvīnī proposes solutions such as rejecting the takfīr of Muslims on the basis of their profession of the two testimonies, accepting the authority of the apparent meaning of the Qur’an while criticizing reports of its distortion, and offering a realistic interpretation of the Companions’ conduct that seeks to justify it and avoids vilification. One of the best models of convergence is “accepting theological differences while maintaining peaceful coexistence.” Although Qazvīnī at times falls into polemical excess, his thought, with its emphasis on shared rational principles and its rejection of exaggeration (ghuluww), has considerable potential to strengthen Islamic unity in contemporary societies.

Abstract Mainstream theories of social welfare and liberal justice, built on the image of the independent, self-sufficient individual, offer insufficient conceptual tools for analyzing the collapse of social order, particularly in war and large-scale crises. The study asks which theoretical framework can explain both the relational breakdown that accompanies war and the possibility of durable peace. To compare the “ethics of care” (Carol Gilligan and the tradition that followed her) with the “logic of relationality and fraternity” (ukhuwwa) in Islamic–Shi'a thought, and to formulate a normative model for rebuilding social welfare in war and post-war contexts. The study is an interpretive conceptual comparative analysis. Its data are the foundational texts and secondary scholarship of both traditions, and the comparison rests on the principle of functional equivalence at three levels: anthropological assumptions, relational ethics, and institutional mechanisms. Both frameworks conceptualize war as a “relational event” resulting from ruptured networks of responsibility, trust, and solidarity, and define peace as a “relational achievement.” The two are complementary: the ethics of care is more precise in analyzing lived vulnerability and structural injustice in the distribution of care, whereas Islamic fraternity, through the concepts of wilāya and takāful, supplies a clearer normative foundation and institutional mechanisms. On this basis, a four-level “care–fraternity” model is proposed as the relational infrastructure of peace. Its main policy implication is that post-war reconstruction should begin with repairing society’s relational infrastructure before physical and political rebuilding

Abstract Civilian rights in armed conflict rest, beyond any treaty, on a fundamental conception of human dignity, and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants derives directly from the epistemological and theological foundations of each religious tradition. The study asks how the divergent theological premises of Old Testament theology and Imāmī theology have led to two distinct approaches to civilians. The study comparatively examines the theological foundations of civilian immunity in armed conflict in Old Testament theology and in Imāmī theology as embodied in the conduct of Imam ʿAlī. This qualitative study employed a descriptive-analytical method within a comparative theological framework. Data were collected through library research from the Old Testament, focusing on Deuteronomy and Joshua, and from Nahj al-Balāgha. The military approach in certain Old Testament war narratives rested on the theological doctrine of ḥerem (total destruction) and on divine command theory; within this framework, divine will was not bound by human conceptions of justice, and the destruction of civilians was theologically justified as a means of preserving the purity of the chosen people. By contrast, Imam ʿAlī’s military conduct was grounded in the doctrines of intrinsic rational goodness and badness and of divine justice; accordingly, the life of a non-combatant, irrespective of belief, was regarded as possessing inherent dignity and immunity. The divergence between the two traditions in their treatment of civilians was not merely juristic or historical; it was rooted in two contrasting epistemological frameworks: an othering, ethnocentric theology and a justice-centered, dignity-based theology

Abstract The Occultation of the Imam of the Age and the lack of manifest access to him raise serious questions about preserving the Sharīʿa. The central question is whether, during the Occultation, preserving the Sharīʿa depends exclusively on mechanisms such as Ijmāʿ Tasharrufī, or whether an interactive model is possible that combines the Imam’s esoteric guidance with collective rationality and dynamic ijtihād. The study seeks to explain how the Sharīʿa is preserved during the Occultation and to move beyond ineffective traditional models. Adopting a descriptive-analytical method and a theological-juristic approach, the study critiques traditional models and proposes a more effective one by explaining the synergy between the Imam’s esoteric guidance and the methodological independence of jurisprudence. Reducing the preservation of the Sharīʿa to mechanisms such as Ijmāʿ Tasharrufī fails to meet contemporary jurisprudential challenges, owing to the lack of conclusive proof that it discloses the Imam’s view, the risk of sacralizing human agreement, and the constraints it imposes on jurists’ scholarly independence. By contrast, the Interactive Model shows that preserving the Sharīʿa requires the synergy of two components: the esoteric and ontological guidance of the Infallible Imam as the intermediary of divine grace, which safeguards the spirit and overall integrity of religion; and the institution of jurisprudence, which derives and applies rulings through collective rationality, dynamic ijtihād, and methodological independence. By avoiding the pitfalls of earlier models, the Interactive Model secures the dynamism of jurisprudence amid rapid historical change and more effectively safeguards the identity coherence and theological structure of Shiʿism.

Abstract The theory of the Imamate in Imāmī thought underwent a fundamental transformation in the second half of the third century AH, during the Minor Occultation: after the martyrdom of Imam al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī, the Imāmī community faced a succession crisis and the rise of rival currents (the Neo-Wāqifites, Jaʿfarites, and Muḥammadites). In this milieu, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad ʿAllān al-Kulaynī al-Rāzī (fl. 279 AH) sought to document and consolidate the Imamate of the Twelfth Imam in his Akhbār al-Qāʾim; the work is lost, but many of its traditions survive in al-Kāfī. The aim of this article is to identify and analyze the components of ʿAllān’s theory of the Imamate, with emphasis on the Imamate of the Twelfth Imam, and his role in consolidating Imāmī doctrine. The study applies a historical-theological analysis to the traditions transmitted from ʿAllān al-Kulaynī in al-Kāfī. ʿAllān emphasized the necessity of a divinely appointed proof (ḥujja), the Imam’s designation by explicit text (naṣṣ), the restriction of an Imamate held by two brothers to al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn, the transmission of the Imamate from father to son, the legitimacy of a minor’s Imamate, the continued life of the Twelfth Imam, and his Occultation as a divinely ordained reality. ʿAllān’s extensive transmission of traditions on the birth of the Twelfth Imam, eyewitness accounts of him, his Occultation, and the explicit designation of al-Ḥujja as Imam reflects a deliberate effort to meet the doctrinal challenges of his time and defend the Twelver theory of the Imamate in the most critical period of Shiʿi history.

Abstract The rise of extremist and violent readings of religion that conflate legitimate jihad with unregulated violence has made it necessary to re-examine the relation between jihad, the ethics of war, and human rights. The central question is on what foundations human rights in wartime rest in Shi'a thought, and how jihad is interpreted and limited so as to safeguard inherent human dignity. This study seeks to explain the foundations of human rights in wartime within Imami thought and to present the relation between war, ethics, and human dignity. The study uses a descriptive-analytical method based on Imami Qur'anic, hadith, jurisprudential, and theological sources to examine the theoretical foundations and normative rules of human rights in war. In the Imami epistemic system, jihad is not a license for violence but a restricted, purposive, and justice-oriented obligation to repel aggression, remove sedition, and protect a just order. This system grounds human rights in war on inherent human dignity, the prohibition of oppression, justice, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, fidelity to covenants, the precedence of invitation and completion of proof over fighting, and the protection of life, property, and reputation; any act of war beyond these limits falls outside legitimate jihad. Even on the battlefield, Shi'a Islam regards human sanctity as fixed and inviolable and, emphasizing the moral responsibility of power and relying on reason, revelation, justice, and human dignity, offers a distinctive, coherent, and human-centered model against takfiri and violent readings.

Abstract One argument some scholars have advanced for the validity of the Companions’ action in selecting the first caliph rests on Qur’an 3:110: the description of the Prophet’s Companions as “the best community” (khayra ummah) and their fulfillment of the duty of enjoining right and forbidding wrong are taken to show that their choice of caliph was correct, since otherwise they would have committed a wrong. The study aims to analyze and assess the claim that the Companions’ action in selecting the caliph was valid on the basis of Qur’an 3:110. Drawing on documentary sources, the study adopts a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach. The substantive pillars of the claim are divided into three: (1) the Companions are the addressees of the verse; (2) “goodness” (khayriyya) is an ontological attribute; and (3) the Companions enjoined every right and forbade every wrong. Since the claim requires all three, each is then analyzed logically. Because goodness in the verse is relative and the description conditional, its addressees are all those who fulfill the duty of enjoining right and forbidding wrong, and this attribute cannot be established for all the Companions. Moreover, relative praise of individuals does not entail their infallibility. Historical evidence does not support the view that all the Companions agreed on the selection of the caliph; consequently, Qur’an 3:110 cannot validly be invoked to establish the correctness of their action in this matter.