1-Introduction
In the terminology of theologians, grace (luṭf) is one of God’s attributes of action and has been defined in various ways. A comprehensive definition would be: “Grace refers to an act that invites the obligated person (mukallaf) to obedience and deters them from disobedience and does not play a role in the mukallaf’s enablement to perform the act (meaning that the mukallaf can perform the act even without grace), nor does it remove their free will.” Whether such an act is obligatory upon God is a point of contention among Muslim scholars. Proponents of the obligation of grace upon God refer to it as the “Rule of Grace” due to its use in various theological issues. One of the important questions about the Rule of Grace is what position Imami theologians have taken regarding this rule. And how did they deal with the objections raised by opponents of this rule? Has there been a critical view of the rule among Imami theologians or not? The present study is organized around answering these questions.
 
2-Methodology
The collection of information for the present research—as required by the subject of the research—has been done through reference to library documents, and the analysis of the collected information is descriptive-analytical, with a historical-evolutionary approach.
3-Literature Review
Numerous articles have been written about the Rule of Grace, but in the reviews and searches conducted, the only article that had a historical perspective on the Rule of Grace in theology was “The Evolution of the Content and Meaning of the Rule of Grace in Shi’a Theology,” written by Musa Malayeri, which, as the title suggests, does not directly address the issue of this research.
4-Conclusion
We can picture three historical periods for the Rule of Grace in terms of the objections concerning it.
1-4. The Period of Formation (Pre-Sheikh Mufid)
By referring to biographical and prosopographical books, we encounter many theologians, some of whom were in the era of the presence of the Infallible Imams (‘a) and were their students, and others who lived in the era of occultation and before Sheikh Mufid, and all of them had books and treatises on various theological topics; but of those works, only the name remains, and only some have reached us. Among the books that have survived from this period, the only book that, in addition to using grace in some issues, also examines the principle of the Rule of Grace, is the book “Al-Yaqut fi 'Ilm al-Kalam” (The Ruby in the Science of Theology) by Abu Ishaq Ibrahim ibn Nobakht.
2-4. The Period of Growth and Development (From the Time of Sheikh Mufid to the Beginning of the Eleventh Century)
With the entry of Sheikh Mufid into the field of theology, the Rule of Grace entered a new stage: Firstly, the Rule of Grace was specifically raised as a theological topic under a specific title in the works of Imami theologians, and secondly, in most books, all issues related to grace, including the evidence and objections surrounding the Rule of Grace, were addressed. The peak of progress in the discussions of grace in this period is owed to Khawaja Nasir al-Din Tusi and Allama Hilli, and the framework that these two prominent scholars established for raising issues of the Rule of Grace has continued to the contemporary period.
3-4. The Period of Doubt (From the Eleventh Century to the Contemporary Period)
What distinguishes this period from the previous period, in addition to some new problems, is the way of dealing with the objections to the Rule of Grace. Unlike previous periods in which Imami theologians all defended the Rule of Grace, in this period some theologians, by mentioning some objections, did not respond to them and seemed to consider them valid.
The Origins of Objections to the Rule of Grace stem from several matters:

A) Confusion of “Theological Obligation” with “Jurisprudential Obligation”: This is the source of the first objection in the second period and the fourth objection from the third period. Similarly, the second, tenth, and eleventh objections from the second period and the fifth, eighth, and ninth objections from the third period also relate to this matter.
B) Incorrect Understanding of the Reality of Grace: The objection to the Rule of Grace in the period of formation falls into this category because it seems to consider the mission of “grace” to be creating motivation - even without the mediation of the mukallaf’s free will. The origin of the third, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, and ninth objections in the second period is also this matter.
C) Ambiguity in the Conditions of the Obligation of Grace: Many of the objections in the second and third periods arise from this matter. In addition to the two conditions mentioned in the definition of the Rule of Grace, two conditions for the obligation of grace are seen in the words of the proponents of the Rule of Grace:

Condition 1: “The Mukallaf’s Responsiveness to Grace and Fulfillment of the Obligation,” which is, of course, a point of disagreement among the proponents of the Rule of Grace. The difference between the answers of Homsi Razi and Muhaqqiq Hilli with the answer of Allama Hilli to the objection “The existence of disbelievers is evidence of the non-obligation of grace” indicates this disagreement because Homsi Razi explicitly, and Muhaqqiq Hilli implicitly, consider the mukallaf’s responsiveness to grace and fulfillment of the obligation as a condition for the obligation of grace. However, Allama Hilli denies the absence of grace in the right of the kafir and recalls that the meaning of grace is not that with its presence, the multufٌ fih (the thing for which grace is provided) is necessarily achieved. In any case, the origin of the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth objections in the second period (the period of growth and development) and the second objection of the third period is this condition.
Condition 2: “The Non-Inclusion of Grace in a Corruption (mafsada) in the Right of the Mukallaf Himself or Other Mukallafs.” The thirteenth objection of the second period and the first and sixth objections of the third period are related to this condition. The objectors claim that ordinary people cannot be aware of the absence of all corruptions in any case to judge the obligation of grace, and they can only discover the absence of corruptions after the realization of an act that is an instance of grace. Based on this, the Rule of Grace loses its property in the position of argumentation. The source of doubt in the obligation of the Rule of Grace and the impossibility of adhering to this rule in the position of argumentation is this condition.